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Abstract
We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence
of distinct adverse selection problems. Some investors have private information
at the time of the IPO and sell their shares in the after-market upon facing
liquidity needs. Others learn their private interest in the after-market, and
sell their shares strategically. The optimal mechanism trades-o¤ informational
rents and rents to strategic traders. Flipping facilitates truthful information
revelation. When liquidity needs are likely, it is optimal to allocate all shares
to investors informed at the IPO stage. Otherwise, some shares are allocated
to those who trade strategically in the after-market.
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I Introduction
Most of the literature considering the optimal allocation and pricing of shares
in initial public o¤erings (hereafter IPO) ignores trading in the after-market
and its impact on the value investors assigned to the shares they bid for. Yet,
incorporating after-market trading in the IPO analysis is critical when there is
residual uncertainty about the value of the stock that some traders can learn
and use. Indeed, if an investor has access to some private information in the
after-market, he can use it strategically and make a prot at the expense of
uninformed investors. Each investors prospect of winning or losing money in
the secondary market is likely to a¤ect his willingness to pay for the shares and
consequently the o¤er price.
It is not always feasible to get rid of all residual uncertainty, and thus of
some potential strategic trading, despite best intentions. Chen and Wilhelm
(2008) argue that underwriters are often unable to capture all the relevant in-
formation during the road show. It may be that information arrives sequentially
or else, that all investors have not been able to process it all during the time
frame of the IPO. Therefore, whether it is desirable or not, strategic trading in
the after-market is often unavoidable and should be taken into account when
characterizing an optimal IPO design.
Evidence of strategic trading in the aftermarket is empirically documented
in Krigman et al. (1999), Minnigoulov (2001), and more recently in Boehmer
et al. (2006). According to these articles, ipping is a signicant predictor of
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future stock performance.1 They establish that some of the after-market trading
is based on information that has not been revealed during the IPO stage.
Ellul and Pagano (2006), Busaba and Chang (2005), and Chen and Wilhelm
(2008) show that incorporating after-market trading leads to interesting new
results. Focusing on under-pricing, Ellul and Pagano (2006) proposes a new
rationale for the well documented under-pricing phenomenon.2 Interestingly,
these authors show that the amount of under-pricing is correlated with liquidity
risk. They consider a setting with two types of private information, one a¤ecting
the primary market (aka pre-market) and the other arising in the after-market.
In their paper underpricing is required to compensate investors who buy shares
in an IPO and potentially liquidate these in the after-market where some traders
have superior information.3 Busaba and Chang (2005) compares price discovery
under book-building and xed price o¤ering. Under book-building, private in-
formation is revealed during the road show in exchange for some informational
rents. By opposition, price discovery takes place in the after-market under xed
price o¤ering. While several seminal papers have established that book-building
leads to a lower cost of price discovery, Busaba and Chang (2005) shows that
incorporating after-market trading leads to new conclusions.4 First, they show
1Flipping is dened as quickly selling some of the shares acquired during the IPO.
2The under-pricing is dened as the (often positive) di¤erence between the price resulting
from the rst day of trading and the IPO o¤er price.
3An additional rationale for under-pricing can be found in Ellis et al. (2000) and Boehmer
and Fishe (2000) who establish a link between the underwriters trading prots in the after-
market and the IPO underpricing.
4The seminal papers in question are Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), Spatt and Srivastava
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that introducing after-market trading increases the required under-pricing under
both methods. More importantly they establish that, unless entry is restricted
under book-building, xed price o¤ering targeting uninformed investors mini-
mizes underpricing. Finally, Chen and Wilhelm (2008) argues that, in a context
where relevant information arrives sequentially, it is optimal to resort to dis-
criminatory pricing to sell the shares. However, regulatory rules require that
IPO shares must be sold at a uniform price. These authors then show how a
strategic allocation of the shares to institutional investors, together with price
stabilization practices from underwriters during the after-market, enables to
overcome the uniform pricing constraint so as to reach a more e¢ cient outcome.
Our paper proposes a complementary analysis to this new strand of research.
It characterizes the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of
distinct adverse selection problems, one a¤ecting the pre-market and the other
the after-market. We consider that the underwriter faces two types of investors.
As in Benveniste and Spindt (1989), some have private information about the
company going public that reects their interest for the shares at the time of
the IPO (these are called type 1 investors). By opposition, others learn their
private interest for the stock in the after-market, that is after the shares have
been allocated and priced (called type 2 investors).5 The realized value of the
share reects the interest of all the investors.
(1991), Benveniste and Busaba (1997), and Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2001).
5As in Chen and Wilhelm (2008), we consider that the after-market stage does not refer
solely to the rst day of trading.
5
The discrepancy in assessing relevant information is motivated by stylized
facts described and analyzed in several papers. On the one hand, the relevant
nancial information is typically complex and diverse and, on the other hand,
investors are not identical in their ability to process this information. The former
is supported by Hirst and Hopkins (1998) suggesting that the time and mental
attention needed for processing nancial information is non-trivial.6 The latter
is motivated in Peng (2005) where information capacity constraint agents do
not learn their information simultaneously. This is even more likely to arise
in an IPO where the time frame is too narrow to incorporate all the relevant
information, as highlighted by Chen and Wilhelm (2008). Finally, Libby et al.
(2002) provides an interesting survey supporting our assumption as it describes
experimental analysis on nancial information processing.
We model the after-market as a competitive dealer market. Because the
investors acquire their information in di¤erent periods, they trade for di¤erent
reasons in the after-market. Following Ellul and Pagano (2006), we consider
that type 1 investors, who have revealed their interest at the IPO stage, sell if
they face liquidity needs. The other type of investors sell or keep their stock
depending on their information.
Due to the distinct adverse selection problems we show that two sources of
rents emerge: the usual informational rents and the rents from trading the asset
strategically. The optimal solution and how much money has to be left on the
6Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) shows that even the format, in which nancial information is
presented, matters.
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tabledepends on how many investors of either type the underwriter faces.
The underwriter can eliminate all rents by allocating all the shares to type 2
investors provided they can exhaust the issue. When this is not the case, the
optimal allocation and price result from trading-o¤ both types of rents. We
then establish the following results.
First, we show that the level of informational rents decreases as type 1 in-
vestors are more likely to face liquidity needs. Because the dealers infer informa-
tion from the o¤er price, which reects the expressions of interest, down-playing
interest results in a lower bid price leading highly interested type 1 investors to
incur a self-inected punishment when they report a low interest for the shares.
Thus, as liquidity needs become more likely, the incentive to misreport high
interest weakens and consequently informational rents become negligible.7 In-
terestingly, this may explain the nding in Aggarwal (2000) according to which
penalty bids, punishing ipping, are seldom implemented. Allowing ipping
can, according to our nding, facilitate truthful information revelation.
Second, as in Benveniste and Spindt (1989), priority is given to investors
reporting high interest at the IPO stage. When these do not exhaust the issue,
the allocation of the remaining shares between type 2 investors and type 1
investors with low interest, is decided as follows. When liquidity needs are likely
to arise, the remaining shares are sold to type 1 investors reporting low interest.
By opposition, type 2 investors receive some shares when type 1 investors are
7This contrasts with Busaba and Chang (2005) where investors benet from lying as they
transfer their informational advantage to the after-market.
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long-term holders i.e. when they are unlikely to face liquidity needs. The
intuition for this result is the following. Allocating shares to type 2 investors
is both benecial and detrimental. On the one hand, it facilitates incentive
compatibility as it mitigates type 1 investors access to a share when reporting
low interest. On the other hand, it generates rents from strategic trading and
decreases type 1 investorswillingness to pay for the stock. Indeed, since type
1 investors face an informational disadvantage in the after-market, their overall
willingness to pay for the shares decreases if part of the shares is allocated to
type 2 investors. The optimal allocation is such that type 2 investors are given
shares when the informational rents are signicant, that is when liquidity needs
are unlikely. How unlikely must liquidity needs be depends on how relevant is
type 2 investorsinformation relative to that of type 1 and how likely it is to
face a type 1 investor with high interest.
Third, we show that when there are not enough type 1 investors to exhaust
the issue (and not enough type 2 either), the underwriter is inclined to sell
shares to type 2 investors for a wider range of the parameters. In this situation
the underwriter is unable to eliminate the informational rents as well as the
rents from informed trading. Yet, to minimize the rents from strategic trading
the best is to favour type 2 investors as these rents decrease the more informed
trading takes place in the after-market.
The paper unfolds as follows. The next section presents the model. The third
section depicts the outcome of the after-market. The fourth section characterizes
the optimal IPO design. Finally, we conclude in section 5.
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II The Model
The model is built upon Benveniste and Spindt (1989). A rm contracts an
underwriter to allocate Q shares to I investors. We abstract from any agency
problem between the rm and the underwriter and assume that the objective is
to maximize the revenue. To keep matters simple we assume that each investor
bids to buy at most 1 share and that we have Q < I.
The investors di¤er in their ability to process nancial information. As a
result they learn their interest for the stock at di¤erent periods. We consider
that n (0  n  I) investors learn their interest for the stock during the road
show. These are labelled type 1 investors. By opposition, we call type 2 investors
those who learn their interest for the share in the after-market, once the shares
have been allocated.
We assume that all investors have a high or low interest for the shares. Let
i 2 f ;+g denote type 1 investor is interest (i  n). Each i is an i.i.d.
realization of a random variable e 2 f ;+g such that e = + with probability
q 2 [0; 1]. Let "j 2 f ";+"g denote type 2 investor j0s interest (j > n). Each
"j is the realization of an i.i.d. random variable e" 2 f ";+"g. We consider that
the expectation of e" is equal to 0. Therefore, e" = +" with probability 12 .
We assume that the value of a share is given by
Vk = v + k +
X
j2(I n)
"j ;
where v > 0 is a commonly known variable and where k =
P
i=1;::;n 
i: Notice
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that
E" (Vk+1   Vk) = 2;
where E" denotes the expectation over ".
To make the analogy with Benveniste and Spindt (1989) note that type
1 investors are similar to their so-called regular investors and type 2 are the
occasional investors. In their paper, the residual uncertainty captured by a pa-
rameter  is of no signicance. In this paper, the residual uncertainty, measured
by the last term of Vk, can be used strategically.
The timing for the IPO is as follows. Initially, each type 1 investor learns
his interest for the stock. Then, the underwriter announces the o¤er price and
allocation rule for each possible messages sent by type 1 investors. Finally,
aware of the mechanism, type 1 investors report their interest and an allocation
and o¤er price are implemented. Note that the underwriter is not restricted to
allocating the shares to the type 1 investors. However, she must select an o¤er
price that each investor accepts once information is updated.
We model the after-market as a competitive dealer market. Type 1 investors
sell their share if they face liquidity needs which arise with probability z. Type
2 investors learn their information and trade strategically. Given the market
structure, it is optimal for them to sell when they have low interest. We do not
allow for short selling.
We characterize the revenue maximizing o¤er price and allocation for each
possible value of n. As this is a sequential game, we solve by backwards induc-
tion to nd a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Solving for the after-market
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rst allows us to calculate the willingness to pay for a share for both types of
investors.
III The aftermarket and the investorsexpected
revenue.
A The after-market.
The after-market is modeled as a dealership market as in Glosten and Milgrom
(1985).
Let state k refer to the state of nature where k type 1 investors reported
high interest i.e. reported +. Let pbk refer to the bid price when the dealer
infers, from the o¤er price, that state k has occurred.8 Let xk(s) denote the
probability that a type 1 investor who revealed interest s 2 f+; g in state k
gets a share. Finally, let bxk denote the probability with which a type 2 investor
gets a share. Full allocation of the shares implies that 8n and 8k  n
kxk(+) + (n  k)xk( ) + (I   n)bxk = Q: (1)
Therefore, the proportion of type 1 investors present in the after-market is given
by:
k =
kxk(+) + (n  k)xk( )
Q
:
8This is in sharp contrast with Pagano and Ellul (2006) where the state of Nature becomes
public information.
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The proportion of informed, and therefore strategic, investors is given by
k =
(I   n)bxk
Q
:
Given that type 1 investors trade if they face liquidity needs, while type 2
investors trade strategically, the overall probability of facing a sell order is given
by
kz + k
1
2
= kz + (1  k) 1
2
:
(When there is no strategic trading this probability is equal to z. When there
is only strategic trading it is 1/2.)
The competitive bid price, in state k, is then given by
pbk =
kz
kz + k
1
2
(v + k) +
k
1
2
kz + k
1
2
(v + k   ")
) pbk = v + k   "
k
1
2
kz + k
1
2
:
B The investorsexpected revenue.
The unconditional probability of state k is given by
k =
2664 n
k
3775 qk(1  q)n k:
From the vantage point of a type 1 investor with low interest state k occurs
with probability
0k =
2664 n  1
k
3775 qk(1  q)n 1 k:
Finally, state k occurs with probability 0k 1 for a type 1 investor with high
interest.
12
Let uk denote the value of a share to a type 1 investor. It is given by
uk = zp
b
k + (1  z) (v + k) ;
which simplies to
uk = v + k  
z"k
k + 2zk
: (2)
Indeed, with probability z, the investor will sell the share in the after-market
and get pbk for it, while he keeps the share with probability (1  z).
Let U(i; s) denote the expected revenue to a type 1 investor when he reports
s 2 f ;+g while his true interest is i 2 f ;+g. A type 1 investor honestly
reporting high interest receives:
U(+;+) =
n 1X
k=0
0kxk+1(+):

uk+1   pok+1

; (3)
while a type 1 investor honestly reporting low interest gets
U( ; ) =
n 1X
k=0
0k:xk( ): [uk   pok] : (4)
Finally, let bU denote the expected revenue to a type 2 investor. We have:
bU = nX
k=0
kbxk [buk   pok] ;
where buk denotes a type 2 investors willingness to pay for a share in state k,
given that he will sell the share in the after-market if his interest is low and
keep it if his interest is high. More precisely we have
buk = 1
2
pbk +
1
2
(v + k + ") ;
which simplies to
buk = v + k + "zkk + 2zk : (5)
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IV The pre-market.
The underwriter selects the o¤er price in each state and the allocation of shares
so as to maximize the expected revenue
Max Q
nX
k=0
kp
o
k
subject to (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) described below.
(i) Incentive compatibility requires that an investor truthfully reports his
interest. As is typically the case (and despite after-market trading), the only
relevant constraint concerns type 1 investors with high interest. We must have
U(+;+)  U(+; );
where U(+;+) is given by (3) and
U(+; ) =
n 1X
k=0
0k:xk( ):

zpbk + (1  z)vk+1   pok

: (6)
(ii) Ex-post voluntary participation states that all investors must accept to
pay the o¤er price once it is posted. Therefore we must have
pok  uk and pok  buk;
(iii) Full allocation of the shares as dened by (1).
(iv) Finally, we must have bxk, xk(+) and xk( ) all between 0 and 1. Thus,
rationing may have to take place in some instances.
Lemma 1: To guarantee incentive compatibility, the rents to a type 1 in-
vestor reporting high interest must be such that
U(+;+)  U( ; ) + 2(1  z)
n 1X
k=0
0k:xk( ):
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Proof. See Appendix 1.
Interestingly one can see that the cost of implementing truthful revelation
depends on z. Indeed, reporting low interest decreases the bid price that the
investor receives if he sells the share in the aftermarket. Thus, the more likely
a type 1 investor is to sell a share in the aftermarket, the weaker his incentive
to misreport high interest.
Lemma 2: The expected revenue of the seller can be written as
Wn = Q
nX
k=0
k (v + k)  (I   n) bU   nqU(+;+) (7)
 n(1  q)U( ; ):
Proof. See Appendix 1.
By opposition to Benveniste and Spindt (1989) the money left on the table
represents not only the informational rents issued to type 1 investors, but also
the rents type 2 investors extract from trading strategically.
First we present the optimal allocation and prices for the specic cases n = 0
and n = I.
Lemma 3:
 When there are no type 1 investors (n = 0), the optimal o¤er price is
pon=0 = v and we have W0 = Qv.
 When there are no type 2 investors (n = I), the optimal o¤er price is
pok = v + k for all k = 0; :::; I   1 and poI is such that the incentive
constraint binds. The allocation of shares gives priority to those reporting
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high interest, xk(+) = min
n
1; Qk
o
, and the remaining shares are allo-
cated to the ones reporting low interest, xk( ) = min

0;
Q  k
I   k

. The
underwriters expected revenue is given by
WI = Q
IX
k=0
k (v + k)  2
q
1  q  (1  z)
Q 1X
k=0
k (Q  k) :
Proof. The case n = 0 is straightforward. When n = I the objective function
depends solely on xk( ) k = 0; :::; I   1 which determines the level of informa-
tional rents. The larger xk( ), the lower is the revenue. (See Appendix 2 for
more details.)
Generally, the optimal mechanism results from trading o¤ informational
rents and rents gathered by type 2 investors. Whether or not the underwriter
can eliminate part or both of these rents depends on how many type 2 investors
she faces.
Lemma 4: When there are enough type 2 investors to absorb the issue
(I   n  Q), it is possible to extract the whole surplus. This can be done either
by allocating all the shares to type 2 investors or, when there are also enough
type 1 investors to absorb the issue, one can allocate all the shares to the type 1
investors in state n at a price pon = un and allocate all the shares to the type 2
investors when at least one type 1 investor reports low interest.
At the solution, type 1 investors have no rents no matter what they reveal
so incentive compatibility holds weakly. Thus, the above mechanism would not
prevail if information acquisition were costly. Costly information acquisition
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is a complex topic in itself and is analyzed in details in Sherman (2000) and
Sherman and Titman (2003). We now consider the complementary situations.
A Enough type 1 investors and too few type 2 investors
to exhaust the issue.
Consider any n > max fQ; I  Qg.9 In proposition 1 we characterize the opti-
mal o¤er prices and describe intuitively the allocation rule. Below, we formally
characterize the optimal allocation rule both, mathematically and graphically.
Proposition 1: For any n > max fQ; I  Qg, the o¤er price is such that
pok = uk for any k = 0; :::; n   1 and pon is such that the incentive constraint
binds:
un   pon =
2(1  z)
0n 1xn(+)
n 1X
k=0
0k:xk( ):
The optimal allocation rule is such that priority is given to type 1 investors
reporting high interest. The remaining shares are allocated to type 2 investors
when z is su¢ ciently low. As z increases, a non-decreasing proportion of these
shares are sold to type 1 investors reporting low interest. For z high enough, all
shares are sold to type 1 investors.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
We now describe precisely the optimal allocation. Type 1 investors reporting
high interest get served systematically. Thus, for all k  Q we have xk( ) =
bxk = 0 and xk(+) = Qk . For all k < Q, we have xk(+) = 1 while bxk and
9These two possibilities result from considering both I > 2Q and I = 2Q.
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xk( ) solve:
(n  k)xk( ) + (I   n) bxk = Q  k:
The optimal bxk is characterized below (see Appendix 2 for details). Let us
introduce the variable  dened as  =
(1  q) "
q
.
 For 0 <  < 2 there exist a unique z1 and z2(k) with 12 < z2(k) < z1 < 1
such that
bxk =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
min
n
1; Q kI n
o
for z  z2(k);
x for any z 2 [z2(k); z1] ;
0 for z  z1;
where the interior solution solves
[(I   n)x (1  2z) + 2zQ]2 = z
2Q2
(1  z) : (8)
The solution bxk is continuous.
 For  = 2 we have
bxk =
8>><>>:
min
n
1; Q kI n
o
for z < 12 ;
0 for z > 12 :
At z = 12 any bxk 2 h0;minn1; Q kI n oi leads to the same payo¤.
 For  > 2, there exists a unique z3(k) 2

0; 12

such that bxk = minn1; Q kI n o
when z  z3(k) and bxk = 0, for all k for z  z3(k).10
The graphs below helps visualize the optimal allocation rule. They represent
the optimal bxk for each possible .
10At z = z3(k), the solution is discontinous. Both bxk = 0 and bxk = minn1; Q kI n o, lead to
the same payo¤.
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Figure 1: Optimal values for bxk when there are enough type 1 investors to
exhaust the issue but not enough type 2 investors.
The rationale for the o¤er price is straightforward. When there are not
enough type 2 investors to absorb the issue, the o¤er price is bounded above
by type 1 investorswillingness to pay, uk. In order to eliminate the rents of
those reporting low interest, it is optimal to set pok = uk for all k = 0; :::; n  1.
Finally pon is set so as to guarantee incentive compatibility.
The optimal allocation is decided as follows. Because both, the informational
rents and the rents from informed trading are decreasing as xk(+) increases, it
is best to favour type 1 investors reporting high interest. When type 1 investors
reporting high interest cannot exhaust the issue, the remaining shares must
either go to type 1 investors reporting low interest or to type 2 investors. When
z is high, informational rents are less of a burden and it is best to serve only
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type 1 investors to save on rents generated by informed trading. By opposition,
when z is low, in order to decrease the signicant informational rents, it is best
to favour type 2 investors at the expense of type 1 investors with low interest.
The extent to which one wants to use type 2 investors depends on . More
precisely there are two factors that can a¤ect : how important is " relative to
 and on q. Indeed, considering (7), one can see that a higher " relative to 
increases the rents from informed trading while a high q gives more weight to
informational rents. Therefore, the underwriter will prefer to stay away from
type 2 investors when "= is high or/and when q is low. Because an increase in
"= increases  and a decrease in q increases  as well, we nd that the larger
 the narrower the range of z over which type 2 investors are being allocated
shares.
The total revenue, for the general case (" > 0) can be written as follows
Wn = Q
nX
k=0
k (v + k)  2 (1  z)
q
1  q
Q 1X
k=0
k (Q  k) (9)
  (I   n)
Q 1X
k=0
kbxk  z"Q
(1  2z) (I   n) bxk + 2zQ   2q(1  q) (1  z)

:
One must subtract the informational rents and the rents from informed trad-
ing to the expected value of the share. Note that by allocating the shares to
type 2 investors, one saves on the informational rents as the last term of the
above expression shows.
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Corollary 1 : When there is no residual uncertainty that can be strategically
used, i.e. when " = 0 and therefore  = 0, it is optimal to allocate the remaining
shares to type 2 investors for any z in [0; 1], so that bxk = minn1; Q kI n o 8z.
The total revenue is then given by
Wn = Qv + nQ (2q   1)  2(1  z) q
1  q
k0 1P
k=0
k [k
0   k] ; (10)
with k0 = Q  I + n.
In all states of nature where type 1 investors reporting low interest do not get
shares (all k such that xk( ) = 0) informational rents are equal to zero. There-
fore, these rents are positive only when there are not enough type 2 investors
and type 1 investors reporting high interest to exhaust the issue (k < k0). This
is represented by the third term in (10). Finally, we can link the result in Corol-
lary 1 to Bennouri and Falconieri (2006) who also show that allocating some
items to uninformed bidders can raise the revenue by decreasing informational
rents.
B Too few type 1 and too few type 2 investors to exhaust
the issue.
The main di¤erence between this case and the preceding one is that bxk can no
longer be set equal to 0. Indeed, since the number of type 1 investors is too low
to absorb the issue, type 2 investors are now guaranteed to get some shares in
all states of nature and we have bxk  Q  n
I   n .
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Proposition 2: When I < 2Q and I  Q < n < Q, the o¤er price pok = uk
for any k = 0; :::; n  1 and pon is such that the incentive constraint binds. The
optimal allocation of shares is similar to that describe in Proposition 1 except
that bxk is now bounded below by Q  n
I   n , and the di¤erent equilibria depend on
whether  is greater, equal or less than 2
Q
n
.
Proof. see Appendix 3.
We describe below the optimal allocation rule.
 For 0 <  < 2Q
n
, there exist unique z5(k) and z4 with 12 < z5(k) < z4,
such that
bxk =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
min
n
1; Q kI n
o
for z  z5(k);
x for any z 2 [z5(k); z4] ;
Q  n
I   n for z  z4;
where the interior solution solves (8). The solution bxk is continuous.
 For  = 2Q
n
,
bxk =
8>><>>:
min
n
1; Q kI n
o
for z < 12 ;
Q  n
I   n for z >
1
2 :
At z = 12 we have a continuum of solutions as any bxk such that Q  nI   n
 bxk  minn1; Q kI n o leads to the same payo¤.
 For  > 2Q
n
, there exists a unique z6(k) such that bxk = minn1; Q kI n o
when z  z6(k) and bxk = Q  n
I   n for z  z6(k).
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At the solution we have
Wn = Q
nX
k=0
k (v + k)  n
z"Q (Q  n)
(1  2z) (Q  n) + 2zQ
 2 q
1  q (1  z)
n 1X
k=0
(Q  k)k (11)
  (I   n) Q
n
n 1X
k=0
kbxk  z"n
(1  2z) (I   n) bxk + 2zQ   2 q1  q (1  z)

:
The gure below, as the one before, helps to visualize the optimal allocation.
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Figure 2: Optimal value forbxk, when there are not enough type 1 and not
enough type 2 to exhaust the issue (but enough of both).
Corollary 2: When there are not enough type 1 investors to exhaust the
issue, the underwriter relies on type 2 investors for a wider range of parameters.
The above corollary highlights the fact that  must now be greater than 2
Q
n
for the optimal allocation rule to change. Since
Q
n
> 1, type 2 investors are
used for a wider range of . As there are too few of each type of investors, it is
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impossible to eliminate the rents from strategic trading. Yet, to minimize these
rents the best is to favour type 2 investors. Strategic rent decrease the more
informed trading takes place in the after-market.
The following corollary gives the optimal allocation rule and the total revenue
when there is no residual uncertainty.
Corollary 3 : When " = 0 and therefore  = 0, it is optimal to al-
locate the remaining shares to type 2 investors for any z in [0; 1], so that
bxk = minn1; Q kI n o 8z. The total revenue is then given by
Wn = Qv + nQ (2q   1)  2(1  z) q
1  q
k0 1P
k=0
k

Q

2  I
n

  k

(12)
+2(1  z) q
1  q

Q
n
  1

n 1P
k=k0
k [Q  k] :
This corollary follows the same intuition as corollary 1. One di¤erence is that
we must always give part of the shares to type 2 investors as type 1 investors
are not numerous enough. This does not generate any cost as " = 0. Instead,
it allows to decrease the amount of informational rents. The savings made by
allocating shares to type 2 investors outweight the cost when k is high enough
(so that type 1 investors reporting low are not served). This is depicted by the
last term of (12) which was systematically equal to 0 in the previous situation.
V On the optimal number of type 1 investors.
According to Lemma 4, it would seem that a greater number of type 2 investors
is optimal as it allows to eliminate both types of rents. This would indeed
be true if type 1 investors had a perfectly correlated information and where
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the value of the shares did not depend on the number of investors reporting
high interest. In our setting, the value of the shares is sensitive to the investors
interest. Indeed, the larger the number of type 1 investors revealing high interest
at the IPO stage, the higher is the value of the share. As a consequence, having
more type 1 investors can pay o¤. Ideally it would be benecial to have a large
number of both, type 1 and type 2 investors. However, we have considered a
slightly di¤erent situation whereby the set of interested investors is xed and
some will acquire their information faster than the others. Within that setting
we ask to what extent does the underwriter benet from generatingmore type
1 investors by facilitating information acquisition?
Unfortunately, due to the complexity of the solution, we cannot reach closed
form solutions in terms of the optimal number of type 1 versus type 2 investors.
However we present now the results we can establish.
Corollary 4: Given (7) when q  12 it is optimal to have n = 0. For q > 12
and z = 1, it is optimal to have n = I.
When q  12 type 1 investors are more likely to reveal low interest and there-
fore depreciate the value of the shares. Moreover, by gathering a large number
of such investors, the underwriter will end up paying more informational rents.
When z = 1, type 1 investors have no incentive to misreport their information.
Therefore, provided q > 12 , having n = I maximizes the revenue. By continuity,
for z close enough to 1, n = I is also optimal. These results apply whether or
not there is residual uncertainty, i.e. whether or not the underwriter has to pay
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rents from informed trading.
When " = 0 and z 6= 1, there are no rents from informed trading. The
overall e¤ect of n on both expressions (10) and (12) is not straightforward. On
the one hand a higher n increases the rst term of Wn provided q > 12 . In a
model similar to Benveniste and Spindt (1989), a greater number of investors
means a lower probability of accessing a share (whatever the signal reported)
and thus lower informational rents. In other words, more competition increases
the revenue. In our model, the impact of a higher n is not so clear as more type 1
investors also means less type 2 investors to rely on. This has two implications.
First, as the underwriter cannot rely as much on type 2 investors informational
rents are paid more often (i.e. for more value of k). Second, in every k where
informational rents are paid, the amount paid is larger. This is so because the
probability of getting a share when reporting low interest is potentially higher
as n increases. Finally, in the case where there are too few of each type of
investors to exhaust the issue, a higher n also a¤ects the last positive term of
(12).
Below are the graphs from the following example.
Example 1 The values for the parameters are as follows: I = 10, Q = 4,
" = 2:5,  = 1, q = 0:51.
In that case, when z is small the underwriter derives higher total revenue
with n = I Q+1 type 1 investors than if he were to face n = I type 1 investors.
When z is large the opposite happens.
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Figure 5: Total revenue as a function of n and z. The di¤erent curves
represent the underwriters total revenue Wn for di¤erent values of n.
VI Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed optimal IPO design incorporating after-market
trading which allows us to consider distinct adverse selection problems. Indeed,
we consider that, due to the nature of nancial information and due to the small
time frame of an IPO, investors di¤er in the information they can access and
use at the time of the IPO. Some learn their interest for the share at the time
of the IPO while others only learn their interest in the after-market, once the
shares have been allocated. Our main ndings are summarized below.
The underwriter faces two types of rents: the traditional informational rents
and the rents associated with strategic trading in the after-market. We nd that
the level of informational rents decreases as the investors who know and report
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their information at the IPO stage are more likely to face liquidity needs. In
other words, allowing the investors who are informed at the time of the IPO to
ip their share can facilitate truthful information report. Indeed investors who
lie about their true interest and report a low instead of a high interest depress
the bid price in the after-market.
When the investors who learn their information in the after-market are nu-
merous enough to exhaust the issue, the underwriter eliminates all rents by
giving them all the shares. When this is not the case, the optimal allocation of
shares results from trading-o¤ both types of rents. As in Benveniste and Spindt
(1989), priority is given to investors truthfully reporting high interest. If these
are not numerous enough to exhaust the issue, the remaining shares either go
to those reporting low interest or to the investors who learn their interest in the
after-market. When liquidity needs are likely to arise, because informational
rents become negligible, the remaining shares are sold to those reporting low
interest. By opposition, in the presence of long-term holders who require higher
informational rents, it is optimal to sell the remaining shares to investors able
to ip their shares strategically. The extent to which generating strategic trad-
ing is best depends on the relative impact of each type of investorsinterest on
the future value of the stock and on how likely it is to face a highly interested
investor.
We believe that several empirical and theoretical work could follow from
this analysis. As expressed, in our setting, it is di¢ cult to say anything about
the optimal balance between both types of investors. We have established the
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benets and costs associated with each of these. Maybe one could consider this
issue more precisely simplifying the setting. Also, one could set as endogenous
the choice of each investors in terms of information gathering and revelation.
Possibly, some investors may try and grab a bit of both rents. Empirically, it
may be interesting to try and disentangle the rents that are left over. It has
been argued, in several papers, that informational rents on their own do not
explain the amount of money that is being left on the table. Would rents
from strategic trading ll the gap? Finally, it can be interesting to nd some
empirical evidence of using ipping as a tool to induce truthful revelation.
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VIII Appendix
 Appendix 1
Proof of Lemma 1:
The incentive compatibility constraint states that investors with high interest
must reveal it truthfully. Let vk = v + k. The expected prot that would
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result from reporting low interest while true interest is high is given by (6).
Misreporting interest changes the o¤er price which also a¤ects the price on the
aftermarket. Given (4), (6) can be re-written as:
U(+; ) = U( ; ) + 2(1  z)
n 1X
k=0
0k:xk( ):
The IC constraint is such that
U(+;+)  U( ; ) + 2(1  z)
n 1X
k=0
0k:xk( ): (13)
This concludes the proof for Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Given the full allocation of the shares, we can rewrite the objective of the
seller as
Max
nX
k=0
k [kxk(+) + (n  k)xk( ) + (I   n)bxk] pok:
Note that xn( ) = 0 and that x0(+) = 0 and nally that
k =
n (1  q)
n  k 
0
k and k+1 =
nq
k + 1
0k: (14)
Given all this we have
nX
k=0
kkxk(+)p
o
k = nq
n 1X
k=0
0kuk+1xk+1 (+)  nqU (+;+) ;
and
nX
k=0
k(n  k)xk( )pok = n (1  q)
n 1X
k=0
0kukxk ( )  n (1  q)U ( ; ) :
We can rewrite the objective function as
Wn = nq
n 1X
k=0
0kuk+1xk+1 (+) + n (1  q)
n 1X
k=0
0kukxk ( ) (15)
+
nX
k=0
k(I   n)bxkpok   n (1  q)U( ; )  nqU (+;+) :
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Note that
nq
n 1X
k=0
0kuk+1xk+1 (+) =
nX
k=0
kkxk (+)uk;
and
n (1  q)
n 1X
k=0
0kukxk ( ) =
nX
k=0
(n  k)kxk ( )uk;
and nally that
nX
k=0
k(I   n)bxkpok = nX
k=0
k(I   n)bxk (pok   uk) + nX
k=0
k(I   n)bxkuk
Substituting the above in (15) we obtain
Wn =
nX
k=0
k(I   n)bxk (pok   uk)  n (1  q)U( ; )  nqU (+;+)
+
nX
k=0
kuk [kxk (+) + (n  k)xk( ) + (I   n)bxk] :
Given that
kxk (+) + (n  k)xk( ) + (I   n)bxk = Q;
we have
Wn = Q
nX
k=0
kuk +
nX
k=0
k(I   n)bxk (pok   uk)
 n (1  q)U( ; )  nqU (+;+) :
Considering the denition of uk, and the fact that
buk   uk = z"
k + 2zk
we have
Wn = Q
nX
k=0
k(v + k) 
nX
k=0
k(I   n)bxk (buk   pok)  nqU (+;+)
 n (1  q)U( ; );
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which proves Lemma 2.
 Appendix 2.
Since (I   n) < Q, even in state 0, type 1 investors must get some of the
shares to exhaust the issue. Therefore x0( ) > 0 and the only relevant ex-post
incentive constraint is given by pok  uk. To guarantee that U( ; ) = 0 we
set pok = uk for k = 0; ::; n  1 and set pon as described in Proposition 1, so that
the IC constraint binds. Incorporating this in the revenue function we get
Wn = Q
nX
k=0
k (v + k)  nq2 (1  z)
n 1X
k=0
0kxk( ) (16)
  (I   n)
n 1X
k=0
kbxk z"
k(1  2z) + 2z
  (I   n)nbxn (bun   pon) :
It is obviously optimal to set xk(+) as high as possible. Therefore, for any
k  Q all the shares go to those reporting high interest (and as a result bxn = 0).
When k  Q   1, we must determine the optimal xk( ) and bxk knowing
that full allocation requires that
(n  k)xk( ) + (I   n) bxk = Q  k:
Incorporating the results given above in terms of xk(+) and pok we can
rewrite the objective function as:
Wn = Q
nX
k=0
k (v + k) 2
q
1  q (1  z)
Q 1X
k=0
k (Q  k)+(I   n)
Q 1X
k=0
kf (bxk) ;
where
f (bxk) = 2 q
1  q (1  z) bxk   z"Qbxk(I   n) bxk (1  2z) + 2zQ:
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We have
dWn
dbxk = (I   n)k dfdbxk for k = 0; :::; Q  1, and
df
dbxk = 2
"
 (1  z) q
(1  q)  
z2Q2"
((I   n) bxk (1  2z) + 2zQ)2
#
and
d2f
dbx2k = 4 (I   n) z2Q2" (1  2z)((I   n) bxk (1  2z) + 2zQ)3 :
Note that for z = 12 ; the objective function is linear in bxk. We have dfdbxk =
2

2  
4q(1  q)

so that the objective function is independent from the value of
bxk for  = 2.
For any z > 12 , the objective function is concave. We have
dWn
dbxk
bxk=0  0, z  z1
and
dWn
dbxk
bxk=minf1;Q kI n g  0, z  z2(k)
where z1 and z2(k) are the unique solutions to11
(1  z1) = 
4
; (17)
1  z2 =
8>>><>>>:
z22Q
2
((I   n) (1  2z2) + 2z2Q)2
for k 2 [0; k0] ;
z22Q
2
(Q  k (1  2z2))2
for k 2 [k0; Q  1] ;
(18)
where k0 2 ]0; Q  1[ is dened such that k0 = Q  (I   n). For any k0 < k < Q
few shares remain to be allocated so that type 2 investors have to be rationed.
11While it is technically possible to have z1 < 0 for  > 4, this variable plays no role for
any  > 2 and therefore we need not worry about this possibility.
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Note that z2(k) is continuous, with
dz2
dk
= 0 for k 2 [0; k0], and we have (using
the implicit function theorem)
dz2
dk
> 0 for k 2 [k0; Q  1] when z2(k) > 12 .
Finally, for z < 12 , the objective function is convex in bxk. We need to examine
its values at bxk = 0 and bxk = minn1; Q kI n o. Let z3(k) be dened such that
Wnjbxk=0 = Wnjbxk=minf1;Q kI n g :
More precisely z3(k) is the unique solution to
2 (1  z3) =
8>><>>:
z3Q
(I   n) + 2z3 (Q  I + n) for k 2 [0; k
0] ;
z3Q
Q  k (1  2z3) for k 2 [k
0; Q  1] :
Note that z3(k) is continuous, with
dz3
dk
= 0 for k 2 [0; k0], and we have (using
the implicit function theorem)
dz3
dk
< 0 for k 2 [k0; Q  1] when z3(k) > 12 .
Setting bxk = minn1; Q kI n o is optimal when z  z3(k) (provided z3  12 ).
When z > z3(k) it is optimal to set bxk = 0.
The optimal solution is then easily determined given the above. There are
3 possibilities.
 For any  > 2, we have z1 < z3(k) < z2(k) < 12 . In that case, for any
z  12 the function is concave and decreasing at bxk = 0, for all k  Q  1,
therefore, it is optimal to set bxk = 0, for all k  Q   1. When z < 12 ,
the function is convex and it is optimal to set bxk = minn1; Q kI n o, for all
k  Q  1 when z  z3(k) and bxk = 0, for all k  Q  1 for z  z3(k).
 For  = 2, we have z1 = z2(k) = z3(k) = 12 . The optimal allocation is
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such that
bxk =
8>><>>:
min
n
1; Q kI n
o
for all k = 0; ::; Q  1 for z < 12 ;
0 for all k = 0; ::; Q  1 for z > 12 :
At z = 12 we have a continuum of solutions as any value for bxk leads to
the same payo¤.
 0 <  < 2 we have 12 < z2(k) < z3(k) < z1. The optimal allocation in
that case is such that
bxk =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
min
n
1; Q kI n
o
for all k = 0; ::; Q  1 for z  z2(k);
x for any z 2 [z2(k); z1] ;
0 for all k = 0; ::; Q  1 for z  z1;
where the interior solution solves
((I   n)x (1  2z) + 2zQ)2 = z
2Q2
(1  z) :
One can easily check that at z = z2(k) we have x = 1 if k  k0 and
x = Q kI n if k > k
0, while x = 0 at z = z1.
 Appendix 3.
Starting with (16), the main di¤erence is that now we cannot have bxn = 0.
It is still clear that it is optimal to set xk(+) = 1 and therefore
(n  k)xk( ) + (I   n)bxk = (Q  k) :
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Taking this into account we can re-write the objective function as
Wn = Q
nX
k=0
k (v + k)  n
z"Q (Q  n)
(1  2z) (Q  n) + 2zQ
 2 q
1  q (1  z)
Q
n
n 1X
k=0
(Q  k)k + (I   n) Q
n
n 1X
k=0
kg(bxk);
where
g(bxk) = 2 q
1  q (1  z) bxk   z"nbxk(I   n) bxk (1  2z) + 2zQ:
We have
dWn
dbxk = (I   n) Qn k dgdbxk where
dg
dbxk = 2 (1  z) q(1  q)   2Qn"z
2
((I   n) bxk (1  2z) + 2zQ)2
and
d2g
dbx2k = 4 (I   n)nQ"z2 (1  2z)((I   n) bxk (1  2z) + 2zQ)3 :
Evaluating the derivative at bxk = Q  n
I   n we have
dWn
dbxk
bxk=Q nI n  0, z  z4;
where z4 is the unique solution to
(1  z4)  z
2
4Qn
(Q  n (1  2z4))2
= 0: (19)
We have
dWn
dbxk
bxk=minf1;Q kI n g  0, z  z5(k);
where
1  z5 =
8>>><>>>:
z25Qn
((I   n) (1  2z5) + 2z5Q)2
for k 2 [0; k0] ;
z25Qn
(Q  k (1  2z5))2
for k 2 [k0; Q  1] ;
(20)
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Note that z5(k) is continuous, with
dz5
dk
= 0 for k 2 [0; k0], and we have (using
the implicit function theorem)
dz5
dk
> 0 for k 2 [k0; Q  1] when z5(k) > 12 .
Finally, comparing the values of Wn at bxk = Q  n
I   n and bxk = minn1; Q kI n o
shows that
Wnjbxk=Q nI n  Wnjbxk=minf1;Q kI n g , z  z6(k);
where z6 is the unique solution to
1  z6 =
8>><>>:
z26Qn
((I   n) (1  2z6) + 2z6Q) (Q  n (1  2z6)) for k 2 [0; k
0] ;
z26Qn
(Q  k(1  2z6)) (Q  n (1  2z6)) for k 2 [k
0; Q  1] :
(21)
Note that z6(k) is continuous, with
dz6
dk
= 0 for k 2 [0; k0], and we have (using
the implicit function theorem)
dz6
dk
< 0 for k 2 [k0; Q  1] when z6(k) > 12 .
One can verify that z2(k) = z4 = z5(k) = 12 for  = 2
Q
n
. For any  > 2
Q
n
,
we have z4 < z5(k) < z2(k) < 12 . And nally for any 0 <  < 2
Q
n
, we have
1
2 < z2(k) < z5(k) < z4. Following the same logic as that used for proposition
1, one can easily prove proposition 2.
 Appendix 4.
We detail here the example provided in subsection 4.3.
The values of the parameters we are considering are given by: I = 10, Q = 4,
" = 2:5,  = 1, q = 0:51.
The underwriter issues 4 shares. In total there are 10 investors. As we
are looking at case 1 (enough type 1 investors and too few type 2 investors to
exhaust the issue), we must have that the number of investors at the IPO is
strictly greater than 6. Given the values of ",  and q, we get that  > 2.
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Given the parameter values and for n = 7, we obtain that12
z3 (3) = 0:4249; z3 (2) = 0:4387; z3 = z3 (1) = 0:4478:
The probability for type 2 investors of getting a share is shown on the graph
below as a function of z:
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Figure 3: Probability for type 2 of getting a share when n = 7. The gures are
based on I = 10, Q = 4, " = 2:5,  = 1, q = 0:51.
Repeating the same exercise for n = 8 and n = 9, we obtain
4249.03 =z z
1ˆ,3 =£" kxk 0ˆ,3 =£" kxk
( ) 4249.033 =z 4387.03 =z z
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n = 8
n = 9
12The values of z vary with n.
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Figure 4: Probability for type 2 of getting a share when n = 8 and n = 9. The
gures are based on I = 10, Q = 4, " = 2:5,  = 1, q = 0:51.
We then compare, given bxk, the total revenue with di¤erent number of in-
vestors at the IPO where the total revenue is given by (9).
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